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Prefatory note: This paper is printed essentially as it was presented
to the conference in April, 1963. The re-entry of Moise Tshombe, re-
placing Cyrille Adoula as Prime Minister of the Congo, has not in-
validated anything in the paper. In fact, subsequent events may help
the reader to appreciate even more one point of the paper-that any
government beholden to foreign powers, public or private, is certain
to generate considerable opposition within its own territory and will
thus be unable to organize for self-sustaining growth. Since this paper
was written, the United States and Belgium (under American prod-
ding) have involved themselves more directly in the Congo, beginning
with technical military assistance, then arms, planes, and pilots, and
finally the well-publicized paratroop attacks on Stanleyville and Paulis
that ensured the defeat of the anti- Tshombe forces in that area. The
only action of the Tshombe government aimed at changing the sys-
tern of external control over capital was the decree of November 29,
1964, dissolving the Comite Special du Katanga and declaring that
all its rights and properties became the rights and properties of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. No real consequences have
flowed from this declaration, and even through 1965 there has been no
real change in the administration of any of the operating companies.
The Congo is one of the largest of the African nations in territory,
being eighty times the size of Belgium and one-third the size of the
United States. Its boundaries enclose land that is varied, so that,
unlike some African nations, the products on which its economy de-
pends are diverse. The tropical forests on either side of the equator
produce for export bananas, cacao, coffee, palm oil, palm kernels,
rubber, and timber. The higher lands produce coffee, cotton, fibers,
* This paper was revised and updated by the author in the spring of 1965.
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and pyrethrum. And from beneath the surface of the earth are ex-
tracted cobalt, copper, gold, manganese, silver, tin, tungsten, uranium,
and zinc, as well as the nonmetallic minerals, coal and diamonds.
Not only has the Congo a near-monopoly on the production of in-
dustrial diamonds, it is also the major African producer of cobalt,
silver, tin, tungsten, and zinc.
Although the Congo is by no means densely populated, its 13 mil-
li.on inhabitants make it one of the larger African nations in popula-
tion. As a labor force, however, this population does not show high
productivity, per capita national income being well under $100. While
this is not an accurate measure of what one man can produce in a
year, it still suggests something less than full commitment of this
resource to commercial production, Actually, fewer than half the
adult male population have been actively engaged in the money
economy-that is, working in productive enterprises other than tradi-
tional agriculture. One can imagine what the Congo would do if the
potential labor force were fully employed. As a consequence of the
paucity of technical and professional personnel among the African
population, most positions requiring such training have been filled
in the past by non-Africans recruited from Europe, largely from
Belgium, at costs that far exceed those for comparable personnel in
Europe. Fernand Bezy, economist at Lovanium University, found that
Belgian personnel in the Congo cost their employers approximately
three times as much as comparable personnel in Belgium.l In 1957,
the 115,000 Europeans in the Congo had a per capita income of
$2, 791, while the 13 million native Congolese had a per capita income
of $42.2
The Congo has had the benefit, more than most African nations,
of considerable capital investment, both public and private. Much of
this is in the mining industry, as a consequence of which productivity
per man has been rising rapidly in this sector, which produces more
than 20 per cent of the national product, yet employs less than 10
per cent of the labor force. The value of the product per African
worker was, in 1957, $812 in the tin industry, $3,820 in the industrial
diamond industry, and $19,210 in the manganese industry, the vari-
ation correlating directly with the amount of capitalization, accord-
ing to Bezy.8 The important role of capital in the economy is sug-
gested when one observes the 49 per cent increase in production in
the mining industry in the years 1950-57, during which time the
number of workers actually decreased. In manufacturing, production
1 Probzemes Structurels de rEconomie Congolaise (Louvain, 1957), p. 186.
2 Ibido, p. 212.
8 Ibido. Do 107.
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increased by 256 per cent, while the number of workers declined.t
During the same period, capital investment in the total economy in-
creased by almost $2.5 billion, capital formation running at the rate
of 3° per cent of gross national product.5
W. W. Rostow, observing the Congo economy of 1951, cited it as
one that lacked only the third condition for the take-off to sustained
growth.6 So healthy was the economy, that the remarkable growth
referred to above was accomplished almost entirely from internal
sources, external borrowing accounting for less than 10 per cent of
the cumulative capital formation from 195° to 1957.1 Actually, it
could well be argued that the Congo's economic growth has always
been financed "internally," for it is unlikely that capital imports have
over the years exceeded the export to Europe of dividends, salaries,
and other benefits. Fernand Bezy concluded a study of economic de--
velopment of the Congo prior to independence on an optimistic
note: "What is important is that the conditions seem satisfied now
for development to proceed by indigenous forces." 8
Such a summary review might justify a prediction of continued
growth for the Congolese economy. With ample natural resources
and labor supply, especially as education proceeds, and with ample
capital sources, organized in the production of mineral and agricul-
tural goods for which the world demand is stable or growing, the
Congo ought to be in the forefront of developing societies, whether
independent or not. But there is something wrong with the picture
these statistics present. They tell us how the economy grew, but they
do not tell us why. Investigating the situation more thoroughly,
identifying the concatenation of circumstances that made for such a
high rate of capital formation before independence, we shall under-
stand that the future may be something quite other than a mere pro-
jection of the past, and we may even be in a position to say what
that future will be. Our approach to this task ought, it seems to me,
to be guided more by the integrated perspective of anthropology,
which prepares us to deal with relationships among all the institutions
of social systems, r~ther than the narrower perspective of economics,
whose perfect analytical models tend, unfortunately, to blind one to
factors that may be crucial in some systems.
t Ibid., p. 196.
5 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Economic Sur-
vey of Africa Since 195°, E/CN. 4/28 (1959).
6 The Stages of Economic Growth (London and New York, 1960), p. 45.
1 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Economic Sur-
vey. ...
8 "Belgian Congo," in Adamantios Pepelasis et al. (eds.), Economic Develop.
ment (New York, 1962), p. 24.
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The Congo economy did not develop by chance, or by the un-
fettered operation of producers and consumers in a free market.
Rather, its development was guided-or cajoled, pushed, forced-by
two strong hands quite deliberately controlled so that they worked
for the most part with perfect coordination. One of the two hands
was the government: first that of the Congo Free State under Leopold
II, from 1885 to 1908, then the Belgian colonial government from
19°9 to 1960. The other hand was the big private investor, primarily
in the mining industry but with fingers extended into all sectors. All
nerves, arteries, and veins led toward Europe, where resided the crucial
tissues of heart and brain. From its very beginnings up to the excite-
ment of the year 1960, this system has seen government in business
and business in government.
Surely it was not chance that brought President Chester Arthur
of the United States to recognize Leopold's private business enter-
prise, the International Association of the Congo, as a "friendly
power" in 1884. This act made a government out of a business. It
was a business free of governmental control, and a government that
derived its power from its capital, not its people. With skillful diplo-
macy and considerable force, the chairman of the board and head of
state staked out his estate in the interior of Africa, making sure that
he got what was necessary to make the state a profitable concern. He
kept control over access to the sea at the mouth of the Congo River
in dealing with Portugal and France. He was able to keep a finger of
land jutting down into the Copperbelt of Rhodesia, by then claimed
by the British South Africa Company, by promising a third of its
wealth to another company in which Rhodes also had major in-
terests, the Katanga Company. It was here, in the mining industry
of Katanga, that business and government were indistinguishable
and that little was left to chance, or free enterprise, either in the
beginning or in recent years, when it became necessary to turn some
sort of government over to those who had been governed.
Because it is so important for an understanding of how economic
development was fostered on such a grand scale, we must go in some
detail into the relations between government and business in the
Congo under colonial rule. Much more than any other government
in Africa, the Congo Government has participated in what has been
called the "private sector" of the economy through direct investment
in common and preferred shares, in bonds, and in loans to business
firms. While this portfolio has been carried regularly in the assets
column of the government balance sheet, it is of course difficult to
determine its precise value at any time because the shares are in such
blocs that they could not be put on the market without depressing
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the price. Professor J. Wertz, in the semiofficial Encyclopedie du
Congo Beige, estimated its total value as of June 3°, 1952, at 11.96
billion francs (U.S. $24° million). Etudes Congolaises reports its value
as of January, 1960, at from 32 to 38 billion francs (U.S. $64° to $760
million). Some part of this, a relatively minor part, consists of invest-
ment in public bodies, such as cities and the Office de Transport,
which is a parastate organ. These figures do not, however, include
regular public investment in roads and such. This government invest-
ment in business enterprise had been growing steadily as the whole
economy developed, and, at the same time, the revenue to the state
increased just as the revenue to private shareholders was increasing.
In 194°, the portfolio of the Belgian Congo brought into the treasury
122,751,535.53 francs (approximately $2-46 million), but by 1951 it
brought into that treasury 344,791,062-40 francs (approximately $6.9
million), and by 1959 it yielded 1,198,000,000 francs (approximately
$24 million). Income from business investments, then, accounted for
something like 7 per cent of total government receipts.9
The most precise information available in 1963 on the constitution
of this investment portfolio was a report in Etudes Congolaises on
th~ situation as of December 31, 1959, just six months prior to in-
dependence}O Sixty-three firms in which the government owned
shares are listed, although the value of these holdings is not estimated.
This same source lists twenty corporations in which the government
has, or had, 5° per cent or more of the shares, or a majority of the
voting rights. These are, or were, just prior to independence:
Banque Centrale du Congo BeIge et du Ruanda-Urundi
Union Nationale des Transports F1uviaux (Unatra)
societe des Chemins de Fer Vicinaux du Congo (Vicicongo)
Compagnie des Chemins de Fer Katanga-Dilolo-Leopoldville (KDL)
societe des Transports en Commun de Uopoldville (TCL)
societe Anonyme BeIge d'Exploitation de la Navigation Aerienne
(Sabena)
societe des Forces Hydro-Electriques du Bas-Congo
societe des Forces Hydro-Electriques de I'Est de la Colonie
societe Miniere du Kasai
Compagnie Miniere du Congo BeIge
9 Sources: I. Wertz, "Organisation Financiere du Congo BeIge et du Ruanda-
Urundi," in L'Encyclopedie du Congo Belge (Brussels, 1953); Banque Centrale du
Congo BeIge et du Ruanda-Urundi, Rapport 1959 (Brussels, 1960); "Quelques
Notes sur le Contentieux Belgo-Congolais," Etudes Congalaises, II, No.5 (1967.),
47.ff.10 Etudes Cangalaises, lac. cit., pp. 104-9.
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societe des Mines d'Or de Kilo-Moto
Compagnie Miniere du Congo Occidental (Cominoc )
societe Miniere du Congo Septentrional (Sominfor)
societe Miniere du Nepoko (Mineko )
societe Miniere du Luebo
Office des Produits Agricoles
Office du Cafe Robusta
Office des Produits Agricoles de Stanleyville
societe Internationale Forestiere et Miniere du Congo (Forminiere)
Comite Special du Katanga (CSK)
The real prize in the government portfolio was the two-thirds share
in the CorDite special du Katanga (CSK). The other third was held
by the Compagnie du Katanga, in which the government also held
shares, though not a controlling proportion. The CSK, to which the
Congo Government had the right to appoint two-thirds of the mem-
bers, held about 25 per cent of the shares of that revenue-producing
giant Union Miniere du Haut Katanga, which itself has scores of
subsidiaries. To give some notion of the significance of Union Miniere
to the Congo portfolio, it can be pointed out that of the 1951 revenue
produced by that portfolio, almost two-thirds was from Union Miniere
alone-$4.4 million of the $6.9 million. In addition to the dividends,
CSK gets a royalty, two-thirds of which goes to the state, amounting
to a sum equivalent to 10 per cent of all dividends distributed over
and above a certain total. In 1951, the government received approxi-
mately $1.38 million under this rubric. Furthermore, Union Miniere
pays to the state taxes of several kinds. Of course, the private investor
in CSK (Compagnie du Katanga, controlled by the Societe Generale
de Belgique) also benefited handsomely, as did the direct investors
in Union Miniere. And its profits permitted the growth of Union
Miniere to be self-financed. By 1959, Union Miniere was able to
distribute profits of $54 million, which meant dividends and royalties
to the Congo Government alone in the amount of $11.5 million in
that year, more than double what it had received in 1951. It should
be clear that whatever the government could do to help Union Mi-
niere and the other mining companies to increase their profits would
benefit the government in two ways: first, it would increase the gov-
ernment's revenue; second, it would make the Congo economy show
up well in terms of economic growth.
How did the government help? Two methods stand out clearly.
First, the government, under Belgian control, holding the power that
stock ownership in corporations gives, regularly yielded that power
of management to the Belgian businessmen who represented private
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financial interests and not necessarily the Congolese public interest.
For example, the government's control of the CSK gave it the
statutory right to name the president of the board of directors of
Union Miniere; nevertheless, that powerful office always went to a
director of the societe Cenerale de Belgique, which owned directly
only a fraction of the voting shares. Similarly, Forminiere, a huge
operation in Kasai before its collapse in 1962, was managed as if it
were a subsidiary of the societe Cenerale even though the government
of the Congo owned 55 per cent of the shares while the societe
Cenerale held a scant 5 per cent.ll In such ways, the directors of the
Societe Cenerale de Belgique came to control a much larger segment
of Congo industry than their risk, in terms of actual capital invest-
ment, warranted. In consequence, this Belgian company is in a
stronger position than its investment warrants in the supranational
system of mining enterprises that involves such giants as Tanganyika
Concessions, Rhodesian Selection Trust, De Beers Consolidated
Mines, Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa, and the British
South Africa Company.
What this means internationally, in the mineral industry especially,
has been treated in other works and cannot be discussed fully here.12
The other outstanding way in which the government of the Belgian
Congo used its power to aid private business interests and thereby
make the Congo a profitable enterprise was fairly complicated, though
it can be stated simply. The government forced the Congolese to
invest their labor in the system. As Fernand Bezy put it in his study
of the Congo economy: "In effect, the developmept of the economy
of the Congo has been financed by the forced savings of the workers
and, in a more general manner, by the local proprietors. In addition,
the economic policy has permitted this phenomenon to take place
and to persist by keeping agricultural prices artificially low in order
to avoid an increase in the cost of living which would entail a raise
in wages." 13
Only in the beginning was it necessary for the government to use,
or to permit the companies to use, labor acquired by direct application
of force. Early collections of ivory and rubber illustrate that approach
only too well. After World War I, the Belgian Government acquired
II For more particulars, see Pierre Joye and Rosine Lewin, Les Trusts au
Congo (Brussels, 1961), especially pp. 217, 227, and 279-88. See also Morpholo-
gie des Groupes Financiers (Brussels, 1962), and various editions of the Mining
Yearbook (London).
12 See Alvin W. Wolfe, "The Team Rules Mining in Southern Africa," Toward
Freedom, January, 1962.
1S "Belgian Congo," p. 213.
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control of the densely populated territory of Ruanda-Urundi, which
could supply large numbers of workers for the Congo plantations and
mines at relatively little cost.
By the 193°'S, the administrative system was firmly enough estab-
lished over the whole of the Congo to control population movement
and ensure tax collection on a per capita basis. This permitted the
inauguration by the government of a rigidly enforced system of native
agriculture that had extremely important consequences. By encourag-
ing, under penalty of imprisonment and whipping, each adult male
not otherwise profitably employed to raise on a specified plot of
ground a specified cash crop-rice, cotton, peanuts, and others-which
could then be sold to a specified "private" buyer, for example, to the
societe d'Elevage et de Culture au Congo, or Compagnie Coton-
niere Congolaise, at a specified price, the government could see to it,
first, that each Congolese had the means to pay the tax in money;
second, that growth of the money sector of the economy was fostered;
and third, that agricultural production was high enough to feed and
clothe those workers removed from the subsistence economy without
raising agricultural prices.
Congolese laborers were remunerated, at minimums established by
the government, in money and in subsistence goods. The lower the
agricultural prices could be maintained, the better could the Con-
golese workers' subsistence needs be taken care of by the paternal
company while the company could operate at a level of profit that
would permit, first, a high rate of reinvestment, and second, a high
rate of dividends in which, of course, the government shared. The
agricultural prices, enforced by the government, were established by
a joint committee of government and agricultural company repre-
sentatives. This is but another instance of the close coalition between
the two, and really the only two, segments of what we have been
calling the "economy of the Congo."
As an illustration of how this operates, we might take the Com-
pagnie Cotonniere Congolaise, owned primarily by the same Belgian
financial corporation mentioned previously in connection with most
mining operations, the societe Cenerale de Belgique. The Belgian
Congo Government participated also, at least up to 1960, by owning
more than 17,000 shares. The government recognized Cotonco, as
the company is popularly known, as having the monopoly rights to
all cotton grown under the government's forced agriculture program
in the northern parts of the colony, in the provinces of Equateur and
Orientale (Stanleyville). The price the company would pay the Con-
golese farmer was, of course, established by the company and the
government: Needless to say, the operation was profitable to the com-
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pany, and to its parent societe Cenerale de Belgique, just as were
the operations of its other affiliates, whether in mining, in power, in
transportation, or in foodstuffs. Needless to say, the operation was
important for the economic growth of the Congo economy, contribut-
ing more than may be apparent to the maintenance of a favorable
balance of trade and a favorable balance of payments.
The foregoing demonstration of the close cooperation between the
Belgian colonial government and the predominantly Belgian private
business firms is introduced into this paper not to tar the Belgians,
after the fact, with the brush of harsh imperial exploitation, but to
identify those conditions which fostered, over many years, a high rate
of growth for the Congo economy. Our problem is to predict, if at
all possible, whether the "Congo economy" will be viable in the years
ahead. In order to attempt that, we must understand what made it
viable in years past. Now, we must inquire what, among these con-
ditions, has changed and what effect such change ought to have on
the economy of the Congo under a political regime that has Congo-
lese occupying governmental positions.
Conditions began to change with the first awareness on the part of
some Belgians in about 1956 that the Congo would have to become
politically independent. Some civil disobedience and violence in the
Congo in 1959 preceded the sudden announcement that the Con-
golese would be granted their independence in 1960. Then, of course,
the events that followed independence-the mutinies, the secessions,
the strikes, the violence, the involvement of the United Nations and
the United States-resulted in such chaos that many observers of the
scene, even after the reintegration of the dissident provinces in 1963,
feel predictions ought not now be made. It will be argued here, how-
ever, that at least two major changes are of such magnitude that the
narrow and rocky path of the future can be identified even through
the smoke raised by internal and international crises that may give the
illusion that all depends on chance and on personalities. These two
changes are: first, the significant weakening of the government, a re-
sult that would have occurred in the process of transfer from colonial
to independent status even without the secessions and mutinies;
second, the relatively greater isolation of an economic system that
had never been in any full sense a "national economy," though econ-
omists, for lack of appropriate concepts, tended to treat it as such.
Though theoretically more important, this second change is much
more complicated and more difficult to argue. For that reason, and
because the first, the weakening of the government, may well be
sufficient basis to predict cessation of growth, and probably inviability,
for the Congo economy, it will be discussed first.
Capital and the Congo 371
More than any other such transition in Africa, the Congo changed
from a political system in which all power derived from above or out-
side the society, to a political system in which the government de-
rived, or was suppos(',l to derive, its power from the will of the gov-
erned. In all the otl:~r territories that have achieved independence,
and even in those which have not, there were institutionalized means
for the expression of will and, frequently, for the making of decisions
by the population, even though the metropolitan state was recognized
as the ultimate source of power. In the Congo, until the last few
years preceding independence, there were virtually no legal means of
expressing opposition, no free labor unions, political parties, or even
traditional communities. The government was in no way dependent
on the support of the population. The decision-makers and adminis-
trators consisted wholly of outsiders. For appointment, they depended
on the Belgian Government. For operating revenue, they depended
heavily on the taxes, royalties, and dividends received from the Eu-
ropean-operated firms. As we have seen, the mutual aid between the
European corporations and the government was such that no opposi-
tion was felt from this quarter, the only other potential source of
power in the situation. Here was, then, an unusually strong govern-
ment, relative to the population.
The Congolese, for their part, were so intimidated-and so dis-
organized-that the government could maintain firm control without
expending great sums on enforcement. As recently as 1953, when the
author was in the Congo, one young European agent, with rank
equivalent to a noncommissioned officer in the Belgian Army, could
maintain a tolerable sort of order ovcr a rural population of more
than 3°,000 Congolese with no more than a submachine gun, a
motorcycle, and 6 or 7 Congolese policemen armed only with clubs.
Even his itinerant prison was self-financing, in a sense, for the prison-
ers were used for public works. Obvious as it was to the local villagers
that they could at any time overpower him, it was also certain that
swift retribution would come in the form of the Force Publique, or
the paratroops, against which their unarmed villages were helpless.
In 1953, the government boasted that Leopoldville, a teeming, boom-
ing city, had fewer policemen than any other city of comparable size.
Now, a government democratically elected, a government of Con-
goJese men, couJd not intimidate the masses of CongoJese as the
BeJgians had done, especially since on the eve of independence there
arose scores of organized power cJiques with rapidly shifting aJign-
ments. At the least, a CongoJese government would have to have the
support of some Congolese. At the very least, a Congolese govern-
ment that would be as strong as the colonial government would need
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much more in the way of enforcement, and where would it get the
revenue for such a task?
The logical source for increased revenue would be those same big
companies which had financed the colonial government. Here, how-
ever, lies a myriad of obstacles. Some disinvestment had begun as
early as 1956, at the mere prospect of greater Congolese participation.
Most of that early "flight of capital" was probably made up of savings
of private persons and smaller enterprises, but by 1959 even the
societe Generale de Belgique showed its concern and perhaps its in-
tention by causing Union Miniere to declare a larger dividend than
usual, and just before independence the Compagnie du Katanga
petitioned to withdraw its shares from, and hence effectively to dis-
solve, the CSK, through which the government had had'the potential,
for sixty years past, to influence Union Miniere by naming directors
to its board.14 It was clear, then, even before independence, that the
European financiers were either not going to cooperate with the Con-
golese Government or were preparing to charge a higher price for
their cooperation than they had under the previous system. In short,
financial structures were being arranged so that the new government
would be in a weaker position vis-a-vis European businessmen than
was the case under Belgian administration.
It must be recalled that under the old regime, a sort of balance of
power was possible between business and government, partly because,
politically, the Congo Government was a branch of the much more
powerful Belgian Government. Under the independent system, the
Congo Government, supposedly deriving its power from the governed,
who are economically impotent, is a weak government at best.
The test came quickly, in July, 196°, when the Banque Centrale,
under European administration and with deposits guaranteed by the
Belgian Banque Nationale, refused to advance to the elected govern-
ment the funds the government felt it needed to pay the Force
Publique in the hope that this might satisfy the mutineers, The July
secession of Katanga and South Kasai-in which provinces are found
Union Miniere, with most of its affiliates, and Miba, producing more
than 7° per cent of the world's industrial diamonds-constituted, of
course, a blow to the financial structure of the state, already consider-
ably weakened by the dissolution of the CSK and by the withdrawal,
during the previous year, of $100 million of private capital even while
the public debt of the Congo had been rising steadily during the
process of financing a major economic development plan, conceived
by the Belgians in 1948. By legal maneuvering, the Congo Govern-
1. See Joye and Lewin, op. cit.; and Morphologie des Groupes Financier.!.
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ment was deprived temporarily, at least, of the voting rights in vir-
tually all those "private" corporations in which it held shares}5
The Belgian Government has a legitimate concern about the in-
tegrity of the Congo and its viability, for the Belgian state stands as
guarantor for most of the Congo public debt. Thus, whereas in the
colonial era the interests of that government and the major private
companies in the Congo were wedded, conditions are now such that
certain companies may benefit from events that are detrimental not
only to the Congo Government but to the Belgian Government}8
This is not the place to discuss the entire Katanga affair, but it is
important to know that neither the societe Generale de Belgique,
Tanganyika Concessions Limited, nor the Katanga Company speak
or act for the state of Belgium. Actually, the secession of Katanga
put the Belgian Government in a most difficult position.
To return to the basic problem the independent Congo faces, we
recall that in so far as the government is elected by universal suffrage
it is dependent on considerable support of the Congolese population,
but in so far as it must have revenue to operate it is dependent on
the European-controlled business firms. The relatively small direct
contribution of the African population to governmental revenue can
be appreciated when one knows that the impot africain-the tax
that encouraged Congolese participation in the money economy and
the only direct tax paid by the overwhelming majority of Africans-
netted only about $7 million, even in 1959, the last full year of Belgian
rule. By contrast, the revenue from the stock portfolio in that year
was $22 million; revenue from the income tax, which applies to Eu-
ropeans and corporations, amounted to $70 million; and income from
customs and excise duties, paid predominantly by Europeans rather
than Africans, due to the grossly uneven distribution of purchasing
power, amounted to more than $100 million.
One might be tempted to interpret as a stabilizing mechanism this
peculiar balance of forces under which an independent government
would have to operate. If the government of the Congo is dependent
on the popular support of Congolese, it cannot move too far from
expressing "the will of the Congolese nation"; on the other hand, so
long as it is dependent for its revenues on the foreign-controlled busi-
ness enterprises, it cannot move too far from a position expressing the
interests of capital investors. To the average American, and possibly
15 Etudes Congolaises, loc. cit., pp. 42-44.
18 For instance, the Katanga secession. If Katanga had successfully seceded
without assuming responsibility for any part of the Congo's public debts, Katanga
and companies operating wholly in Katanga would have benefited while the
Congo and Belgium would have suffered.
the average European as well, such a situation suggests a moderate
"middle-of-the-road" government that ought to be positively valued.
Given, however, the structure of the Congo economy and polity, and
taking into account that the remarkable growth of the Congo econ-
omy in the past was achieved with the very active participation of a
strong government, it is perhaps more valid to interpret this peculiar
balance as one that places the government between two essentially
opposed forces capable of tossing the much weakened government in
a stormy political sea. In such a situation, no Congolese government
will be able to act decisively in matters that have a direct bearing on
the development of an economy that, despite its apparent self-suf-
ficiency, is woefully lacking in local capital and in the means to in-
crease local savings. Virtually the only indigenous capital is that held
by government, and that capital was built up, as was the foreign
private capital, during a period when the colonial government could
apply firm controls on labor and prices. What can a weak government
do?
One of the first things the new Congo Government almost had to
do was to meet the demands of the soldiers of the Force Publique
for higher salaries. Later, it granted salary increases to most govern-
ment personnel. Within a year of independence most clerical salaries
had tripled. The general desire for more money in the pocket, and a
serious diminution of production of many necessities, combined with
other factors beyond the control of the government to bring about
serious inflation. According to the price index calculated by an eco-
nomic research unit at Lovanium University, the price level had
doubled in the first two years of independence}7 The skyrocketing
costs of government accompanied by serious reduction of revenue
created conditions favorable to even more inflation. If the colonial
government's ability to keep the Congolese cost of living, and there-
fore wages, at low levels was important in maintaining the profitability
of capital investment prior to 1960, the new government's inability to
control these factors now makes unlikely any increase of investment.
The huge deficits in the public accounts are not simply temporary;
they are not due only to the secession of Katanga. Expenditures are
up because of inflation, but also because certain public needs, such
as higher education and the maintenance of legislative bodies, simply
have to be met. It is unlikely that expenditures will recede; therefore,
it is essential that revenue shall increase if there is to be any kind of
political stability that might make economic development possible.
What can produce the necessary revenue?
1,( Etudes Congolaises, III, No.8 (1961.), 17-1.6.
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We noted earlier that the Belgian-enforced agricultural program
served to increase the supply of foods and fibers locally produced at
a relatively cheap price. The present government, dependent as it is
on Congolese support, can no longer enforce so effectively this pro-
gram. The seriousness of the breakdown is seen in production figures.
The 1961 cotton crop amounted to a mere 7.0,000 tons, as against an
average of more than 5°,000 tons annually in the six preceding years.
Rice production, equally dependent on government pressure on in-
dividual Congolese villagers, dropped to 54,000 tons in the year 1961
from an average of almost 175,000 tons in preceding years. That these
declines are due primarily to collapse of the government's agricultural
program and not to breakdown of the commercial economy or the
transportation system seems demonstrated by comparison with figures
for rubber and palm oil, export items produced primarily on Euro-
pean-operated plantations. Rubber production was hardly affected by
the events of independence, for the exports of rubber in both 1960
and 1961 amounted to more than 35,000 tons, very close to the average
in the four preceding years. The Congo exported, through the port
of Matadi, in 1961, 153,000 tons of palm oil, only slightly below the
annual average of 17°,000 tons in the four preceding years.18
Caught between the need for popular support and the need for
revenue that only the foreign-owned corporations can now supply,
any government of the Republic of the Congo is unstable. A further
difficulty, from this point of view, derives from the fact that the gov-
ernment of 1967.-63 was able to bring back under its jurisdiction the
major mining firms only through the intervention of the United
Nations, the United States, and finally, Belgium. In the process, de-
pendence on these additional external elements increased. In order
to train and maintain the vastly enlarged military and police forces
now necessary simply to keep the Congo integrated-for which is re-
quired much more revenue than was produced under much better
circumstances-American and Belgian technical and financial assist-
ance was accepted. Any government so beholden to foreign powers
is certain to generate considerable opposition within its own nation.
Obviously, under these circumstances, little attention can be given
to the problems of organizing for genuinely "self-sustaining growth,"
an undertaking fraught with difficulties even for nations much more
efficiently organized than the Congo.
It is appropriate now to consider tfte second of those two major
changes that bear so heavily on the economic future of the Congo-
referred to above as "the relatively greater isolation of an economic
18 The figures for production and export are all taken from Main Congo
Agricultural Products, Annual Review (Antwerp, 1961).
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system which had never been in any full sense a 'national economy.' "
Politically, the Congo was always an adjunct to the Belgian state
system, even though it had, constitutionally, a personnalite unique.
Economically, it was an adjunct to the Western industrial system.
Almost wholly devoid of private indigenous capital, and lacking any
internal capital market, its capitalization depended ultimately on the
world financial markets. Even though most financing was from re-
invested profits, the decisions regarding reinvestment and dividend
distribution were made with an eye to the world money market. In-
ternal demand for goods produced by the commercial sector of the
economy was so low in relation to production capability that more
than 60 per cent of the product was intended for sale abroad. On the
other hand, the needs of the commercial sector were such that almost
4° per cent of the disposable goods were imported.19
The point is simply that the "Congo economy" (and I call attention
to the quotation marks) is so tightly integrated with other national
economies that it seems unrealistic to view anything as the "Congo
economy." All the factors of production, including entrepreneurship,
depend in important ways on outsiders. Patterns of internal distribu-
tion, as we have seen, were not the result of free interplay in a market
but were heavily controlled by a government whose power derived
from the outside. The major market for the goods produced in the
Congo was the world market, upon which internal Congo forces had
vi~tually no effect.
Another vitally important way in which economic institutions in
the Congo are far from independent is seen when one analyzes the
mineral industry of Southern Africa as a whole.2° The mining firms in
the Congo, the single most important sector of the "Congo econ-
omy," are integrated with not only the parent firms in Belgium, but
with other mining firms in Southern Africa, on which depend the
"economies" of the Rhodesias, Angola, South West Africa, and the
Republic of South Africa. Not merely do they participate in the same
world capital market, and in the same market for the sale of their
minerals, but they participate in a common system of production
through functional agreements, formal and informal, and through
interlocking directorates that ensure the sharing of information among~
19 Bezy, "Belgian Congo," p. 2°3.
20 See Wolfe, "The Team Rules Mining in Southern Africa," Toward Free.
dom, January, 1962; Wolfe, "The African Mineral Industry and Its Significance
for Anthropological Theory," unpublished paper presented to 61St Annual Meet-
ing of the American Anthropological Association, 1962; and Wolfe, "The African
Mineral Industry: Evolution of a Supranational Level of Integration," SociaJ
Problems, Fall, 1963.
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all firms. Similarly, the transportation network which most of these
firms use and have interest in is an international one that necessitates
a certain economic integration.
For all the foregoing reasons, we should question whether there is
any but a spurious statistical validity in the concept of a unique
Congo economy. So much does every aspect of the commerce of the
Congo depend on other economic systems that predictions cannot
possibly be made from a study of internal economic resources and
their organization. The Congo itself was certainly not at the point
of "take-off to sustained growth." The forces that produced statistics
indicating such growth were generated and controlled by institutions
external to Congo society. The events of 1960, somewhat euphemisti-
cally called "the achievement of independence," changed the social
and political structure of the Congo so markedly as to weaken those
forces significantly. To the extent that the economic units in the
Congo become isolated from the total Western industrial economic
system-by the rupture of the political bonds with Belgium, by the
straining of the bonds which made for close collaboration between
European firms and the Congo Government-the economic statistics
will show considerably less potential for growth. On the other hand,
to the extent that such bonds remain intact, political independence
has very little meaning. The dilemma of the Congo would appear to
be this: The welfare of the Congolese is dependent upon an inter-
national industrial system in which they participate without having,
even through their own government, any significant voice. Perhaps
realistic analysis would reveal that this is the dilemma of all Africans,
and a dilemma they share with many other peoples in both East and
West-the dilemma of those who strive for political independence
in isolated state structures even while economic realities necessitate
interdependence.
